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Abstract
Critics  who  are  concerned  over  the  epistemological  status  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  often
describe  them  as  being  constructed.  In  contrast,  those  critics  usually  see  symptoms  as
relatively  epistemologically  unproblematic.  In  this  paper  I  show  that  symptoms  are  also
constructed.  To  do  this  I  draw  upon  the  demarcation  between  data  and  phenomena.  I  relate
this  distinction  to  psychiatry  by  portraying  behaviour  of  individuals  as  data  and  symptoms
as  phenomena.  I  then  draw  upon  philosophers  who  consider  phenomena  to  be  constructed
to  argue  that  symptoms  are  also  constructed.  Rather  than  being  ready  made  in  the  world  I
show  how  symptoms  are  constructs  we  apply  to  the  world.  I  highlight  this  with  a  historical
example  and  describe  methodological  constraints  on  symptom  construction.  I  show  the
epistemic  problems  with  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  also  applicable  to  symptoms.  Following
this,  I  suggest  that  critics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  should  extend  their  criticism  to
symptoms  or,  if  they  still  believe  symptoms  are  relatively  epistemologically  unproblematic,
should  rethink  their  concerns  over  psychiatric  diagnoses.  
1.0  Introduction
Critics  often  claim  that  most  or  all  currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  
constructed,  arbitrary,  an  invention  or  made-up.  They  argue  that  those  psychiatric  diagnoses  
should  be  abandoned.  They  vary  over  whether  psychiatric  diagnoses  should  be  fully  
abandoned,  being  replaced  with  some  alternative  which  are  not  psychiatric  diagnoses,  or  if  
they  should  be  replaced  with  superior  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Many,  though  not  all,  such  
critics  have  much  less  concern  about  psychiatric  symptoms.  These  critics  do  not  argue  that  
most  or  all  symptoms  should  be  abandoned,  to  be  either  replaced  with  some  alternative  
which  are  not  symptoms  or  replaced  with  alternative,  superior  symptoms.  Such  critics  of  
psychiatric  diagnoses  typically  believe  that  people  do  actually  exhibit  symptoms  (for  
example  Boyle  1990,  p.166;  Cushing  2013,  p.39;  Cuthbert  2014,  p.32;  Johnstone  2018,  
p.39;  Kinderman  et  al  2013,  p.3;  Kirk,  Cohen  &  Gomory  2015,  p.67;  Read  2004a,  p.48;  
Vanheule,  2017,  p.162).  For  example,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  some  people  do  actually  
exhibit  low  social  skills  and  low  eye  contact.  However,  in  this  article  I  will  argue  that  
psychiatric  symptoms  face  many  of  the  same  criticisms  that  are  levelled  at  psychiatric  
diagnoses.  In  line  with  common  criticisms  of  psychiatric  diagnoses,  symptoms  should  not  be
understood  as  ready-made,  out  there  in  nature  ‘things’  which  people  exhibit.  Rather,  
symptoms  have  to  be  assigned  to  people.  Psychiatric  symptoms,  like  psychiatric  diagnoses,  
could  also  be  considered  as  ‘constructed’  or  ‘invented’.  This  means  that  psychiatric  
diagnoses  and  symptoms  have  a  more  similar  epistemic  status  than  is  typically  presumed.  I  
will  show  how  this  has  consequences  for  the  epistemic  status  of  both  symptoms  and  
diagnoses.  
I  will  develop  a  new  conceptual  understanding  of  symptoms.  I  demarcate  between,  
firstly,  individual  instances  of  behaviour  which  vary  from  one  another  in  how  they  
specifically  manifest  and,  secondly,  symptoms  which  abstract  away  those  specific  details.  
The  behaviour  which  an  individual  actually  exhibits  is  not  the  same  as  the  symptoms  that  
they  are  assigned  because  the  behaviour  has  specific  details  which  are  missing  from  the  
abstract  symptom.  To  make  this  argument,  I  draw  upon  a  distinction  employed  by  some  
philosophers  of  science,  that  of  data  and  phenomena.  Data  is  the  product  of  specific  causal
factors  which  are  present  in  specific  experimental  set-ups,  such  as  the  ambient  air  
temperature  on  a  particular  day.  These  can  vary  from  one  experimental  setup  to  another.  In 
contrast,  phenomena  abstracts  away  those  specific  details  to  create  a  more  generalised  
scientific  concept  which  is  applicable  to  multiple  experimental  setups  or  real  world  settings  
rather  than  being  tied  to  specific  factors  present  in  specific  situations.  For  example,  the  
melting  point  of  lead  is  considered  to  be  235°C  even  though  the  exact  figure  measured  can
vary  due  to  the  environmental  conditions  present  during  specific  measurements.  Following  
this  distinction  I  portray  behaviour  as  data  and  symptoms  as  phenomena.  Behaviour,  like  
data,  are  tied  to  specific  instances  whereas  symptoms,  like  phenomena,  are  models  which  
abstract  away  those  specific  details.  I  highlight  this  distinction  with  an  historical  example  
and  then,  outline  constraints  on  formulating  symptoms  from  behaviour.  
Finally,  I  argue  that  conceptualising  symptoms  as  phenomena  has  an  important  
consequence  for  the  status  of  symptoms.  Phenomena  should  be  conceptualised  as  constructed
by  scientists  rather  than  as  coming  ready  made  by  the  world.  Following  this,  symptoms  
should  also  be  seen  as  constructed  by  psychiatrists  rather  than  being  ready  made.  This  has  
epistemic  consequences  for  both  symptoms  and  diagnoses.  Critics  often  associate  
construction  with  arbitrariness  and  bad  science  (Bentall  1992,  p.24;  Burrows  2010,  p.252;  
Tucker  1998,  p.159,  for  further  discussion  from  non-critics  see  Beebee  &  |Sabbarton-Leavy  
2010,  p.16;  Meehl  1995,  p.268).  However,  I  show  that  symptoms,  like  diagnoses,  are  
constructed.  Critics  can  hold  different  reasons  for  taking  construction  to  entail  that  
psychiatric  diagnoses  are  flawed  so  I  will  be  more  specific  in  my  discussion.  I  show  that  
many  arguments  which  critics  use  against  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  also  applicable  to  
symptoms.  I  then  outline  three  options  for  critics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Firstly,  critics  
who  are  concerned  over  psychiatric  diagnoses  because  they  are  constructed  might  have  
similar  concerns  about  symptoms.  Secondly,  a  critic  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  who  thought  
symptoms,  despite  being  constructed,  are  relatively  unproblematic  might  reconsider  their  
concern  over  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Thirdly,  a  critic  could  argue  that  symptoms  are  
constructed  in  an  unproblematic  manner  whereas  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constructed  in  a  
problematic  manner.  My  primary  aim  in  this  paper  is  to  present  a  challenge  to  the  critics  
of  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Critics  need  to  show  why  psychiatric  diagnoses  (or  particular  
psychiatric  diagnosis)  are  constructed  in  a  problematic  manner  or  either  also  reject  
symptoms  (since  they  are  constructed)  or  accept  psychiatric  diagnoses  (even  though  they  are
constructed).  More  tentatively,  I  finish  by  sketching  my  preferred  response  to  the  dilemma  I
have  posed.  I  suggest  the  best  way  to  respond  to  the  claim  that  symptoms  and  diagnoses  
are  both  constructed  is  to  argue  that  construction  need  not  lead  to  scepticism.  I  will  argue  
that  we  should  accept  both  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  symptoms  in  principle,  and  in  
actuality  many  currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  symptoms  should  be  accepted.  
Both  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  symptoms  are  constructed,  but  construction  need  not  be  a  
barrier  to  scientific  worth  in  psychiatry.  
2.0  Construction  in  psychiatry  
Critics  often  claim  that  (some  or  all)  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  “arbitrarily  constructed”  
(Burrows,  2010,  p.252),  “constructed”  (Gains,  1992  p.4;  Summerfield  2001,  p.95),  
“arbitrary”  (Cushing  2013,  p.38;  Horwitz  2002,  p.5)  an  “invention”  (Read  2004b,  p.21;  
Summerfield  2001,  p.95),  “made-up”  (Watson  2019,  p.2).  They  are  also  considered  to  be  
often  formulated  on  harmful  extra-scientific  factors  (Cooper  2005,  p.150;  Jablensky  1999,  
p.138;  Poland  2014,  p.35)  or  to  be  epistemologically  weak  (Cooper  2005,  p.150;  Murphy  
2006,  p.10;  Poland  2015,  p.37).  These  critics  come  from  a  variety  of  fields,  such  as  
psychiatry,  philosophy  of  psychiatry,  psychotherapy,  sociology,  history  and  disability  studies. 
They  hold  a  significant  diversity  of  implicit  and  explicit  standpoints.  For  convenience,  I  
shall  use  the  general  term  'constructed'  in  what  follows  to  cover  these  concerns.  There  are  
various  ways  in  which  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  can  be  considered  'constructed'  which  I  shall  
outline  below.  
Firstly,  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be  seen  as  always  taking  a  constructed  form  or  can
be  seen  as  potentially  non-constructed  depending  upon  if  there  is  a  target  for  them  to  
describe.  Psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be  seen  as  necessarily  constructed  because  they  lack  a  
target  in  the  world  which  they  could  reflect  or  resemble.  Reality  is  seen  as  not  taking  a  
form  whereby  people  fall  into  groupings  which  psychiatric  diagnoses  could  describe.  
Alternatively,  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be  seen  as  not  necessarily  constructed  because  there 
is  a  target  which  they  could  describe.  People,  or  particular  aspects  of  people,  sometimes  
take  a  form  which  is  amenable  to  description  by  psychiatric  diagnoses.  In  this  case  then  
when  a  critic  claims  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constructed  they  mean  that  most  or  all  
currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  fail  to  describe  any  suitable  target.  However,  it  is  
believed  to  be  possible  to  produce  alternative  psychiatric  diagnoses  which  are  not  
constructed.  
Secondly,  constructs  can  be  seen  as  scientifically  problematic  or  as  scientifically  non-
problematic.  By  scientifically  problematic  I  mean  non-scientific,  weak  science  or  bad  
science.  Construction  can  be  considered  scientifically  problematic  if  the  construct  is  seen  as 
too  greatly  the  product  of  a  decision  making  process  rather  than  scientific  evidence.  Various
views  can  be  held  over  what  constitutes  scientific  evidence  and  over  what  degree  of  
decision  making  is  acceptable  given  any  particular  level  of  scientific  evidence  available  
(decision  making  might  be  seen  as  more  acceptable,  or  as  less  acceptable,  when  higher  
levels  of  scientific  evidence  are  present).  A  critic  would  claim  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  
constructed  in  a  problematic  manner  if  they  think  they  exceed  an  unacceptable  level  of  
decision  making.  In  contrast  to  this  approach,  it  is  possible  to  consider  construction  as  
scientifically  acceptable  whereby  construction  is  seen  as  fully  compatible  with  good  science. 
Following  these  demarcations,  there  are  critics  who  think  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  
are  necessarily  constructed  and  that  construction  is  scientifically  problematic.  These  critics  
think  that  we  should  not  only  stop  using  currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  but  also  
not  attempt  to  develop  alternative,  superior,  non-constructed  psychiatric  diagnoses  (since  a  
non-constructed  psychiatric  diagnosis  is  impossible).  We  should  simply  stop  using  
psychiatric  diagnoses  altogether  (Boyle  1990,  p.166;  Bentall  1992,  p.34;  Cromby,  Harper  
and  Reavey  2015,  p.116;  Johnstone  2018,  p.39;  Kinderman  et  al  2013,  p.3;  Kirk,  Cohen  & 
Gomory  2015,  p.67;  Read  2004a,  p.48;  Runswick  -Cole  2016,  p.27).  Then  there  are  critics  
who  think  that  currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constructed,  but  also  that  
alternative  psychiatric  diagnoses  could  be  non-constructed,  and  also  that  construction  is  
scientifically  problematic.  These  critics  typically  call  for  abandoning  currently  employed  
psychiatric  diagnoses  and  replacing  them  with  new,  superior  ones.  Some  such  critics  think  
superior  psychiatric  diagnoses  should  still  be  DSM-style  categorical,  polythetic  psychiatric  
diagnoses  (Cooper  2005,  p.53;  Murphy  2006,  p.224)  and  others  think  that  we  should  move  
to  dimensional  psychiatric  diagnoses  (Cuthbert  &  Insel  2013,  p.3;  Lilienfeld  2014,  p.131).  
Analogous  concerns  about  construction  are  sometimes  raised  about  symptoms.  
Symptoms  can  be  seen  as  necessarily  constructed  or  as  potentially  non-constructed.  In  the  
latter  case,  currently  employed  symptoms  could  be  seen  as  never,  rarely,  often  or  always  
constructed.  Additionally,  constructed  symptoms  can  be  seen  as  problematic  or  non-
problematic.  Whether  they  are  described  as  constructed  or  not  it  is  certainly  true  that  there  
is  concern  over  the  scientific  adequacy  of  various  symptoms.  For  example,  there  are  
concerns  over  the  manner  in  which  hallucinations  are  defined  (see  Parnas  &  Sass  2008,  
p.249;  Campbell  2002,  p.96).  As  a  second  example,  there  are  concerns  over  how  notions  of
empathy  are  understood  (see  Ratcliffe  2014,  p.275;  Slaby  2014,  p.255).
Having  demarcated  various  views  on  construction  I  now  outline  the  target  of  my  
article.  I  focus  upon  critics  who  are  concerned  about  psychiatric  diagnoses  but  who  have  
much  less  concern  about  symptoms.  There  are  many  critics  who  are  concerned  over  
psychiatric  diagnoses  being  constructed  but  are  not  concerned,  or  have  much  less  concern,  
over  symptoms  being  constructed.  It  is  widely  accepted,  even  by  critics  of  psychiatric  
diagnoses,  that  many  diagnosed  people  exhibit  symptoms  (for  example,  Boyle  1990,  p.166;  
Cushing  2013,  p.39;  Cuthbert  2014,  p.32;  Kirk,  Cohen  and  Gomory  2015,  p.67,  Vanheule  
2017,  p.206).  Few  people  doubt,  for  example,  that  most  people  who  meet  the  diagnostic  
criteria  of  autism  do  actually  have  low  social  skills  and  exhibit  low  eye  contact.  Eyes  are  
real  parts  of  the  world.  Where  eyes  look  and  for  how  long  are  measurable  facts.  Similarly, 
the  manner  in  which  people  socialise  is  in  some  sense  real  and  is  potentially  measurable.  
That  diagnoses  are  considered  more  problematic  than  symptoms  can  be  highlighted  through  
considering  how  some  critics  propose  abandoning  psychiatric  diagnoses  to  instead  focus  on  
symptoms.  For  example,  in  an  article  calling  for  the  abandonment  of  psychiatric  diagnoses,  
Kinderman,  Read,  Moncrieff  and  Bentall  still  talk  of  “symptoms”  and  how  a  future  
psychiatry  would  focus  upon  things  like  “depressed  mood,  auditory  hallucinations  and  
intrusive  thoughts”  (2013,  p.2)  rather  than  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Also,  a  critic  of  autism  
“propose[s]  [to]  focus  instead  on  specific  deficiencies,  like  sensory  processing  disorders,  
communication  difficulties  or  food  sensitivities  and  stop  trying  to  cluster  them  together  as  
something  called  'autism'”  (Cushing  2013,  p.39).  Also,  a  critic  of  schizophrenia  writes  that  
she  does  not  deny  that  people  exhibit  many  of  the  symptoms  associated  with  schizophrenia, 
such  as  hearing  voices  and  confused  thinking.  She  believes  psychiatrists  “should  devote  
enormous  energy  and  resources  to  trying  to  understand  why  these  phenomena  occur  and  
what  variables  influence  them,  but  without  inferring  unsupported  concepts  like  
schizophrenia"  (Boyle  1990,  p.166).  Consider  also  how  philosophers  of  psychiatry  Cooper  
and  Murphy  argue  that  almost  all  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  epistemologically  problematic  
and  in  need  of  replacement  (Cooper  2005,  p.150;  Murphy  2006,  p.10)  whereas  they  do  not 
make  similar  claims  about  symptoms.  Rather,  they  have  concerns  over  a  much  smaller  list  
of  symptoms.  Finally,  projects  like  Research  Domain  Criteria  (RDoC)  hope  that  currently  
employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  reformulated  into  dimensional  ones  but  notions  that  
currently  employed  symptoms  need  replacing  are  near  completely  absent  within  the  many  
publications  which  the  RDoC  project  has  produced.  As  the  current  director  of  RDoC  writes,
“[t]he  concern  about  the  current  diagnostic  environment  has  not  been  so  much  with  the  
symptoms  themselves”  (Cuthbert  2014,  p.32).  Explicit  statements  saying  that  symptoms  are  
usually  not  constructed  or  are  constructed  in  a  scientifically  unproblematic  manner  are  
absent  from  these  sources  but  they  seem  to  treat  most  symptoms  as  non-constructed  and  as 
scientifically  unproblematic.  
3.0  The  distinction  between  behaviour  and  symptoms
Psychiatrists  typically  see  people  as  exhibiting  symptoms.  For  example,  autistic  people  are  
considered  to  typically  exhibit  symptoms  like  low  social  skills  and  repetitive  behaviour  
whilst  schizophrenic  people  are  typically  considered  to  exhibit  symptoms  like  hallucinations  
and  delusions.  Symptoms  are  typically  considered  to  be  ways  of  behaving.1
In  this  paper,  I  will  critique  the  notion  that  people  straightforwardly  have  symptoms. 
Claiming  that  people  have  symptoms  conceals  some  important  distinctions  which  this  paper  
brings  out.  It  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  people  behave  in  particular  ways  but  are  
assigned  symptoms.  
To  highlight  the  distinction  between  behaviour  and  symptoms  I  now  show  how  two  
instances  of  behaviour  can  differ  from  one  another  yet  still  constitute  an  instance  of  the  
same  symptom.  Imagine  two  instances  of  the  symptom  low  eye  contact.  Both  instances  will
involve  an  abnormal  lack  of  eye  contact.  However,  the  exact  level  of  eye  contact  will  
likely  differ  in  each  case.  So  too  will  where  each  pair  of  eyes  look  and  for  how  long.  
Specific  details  which  are  applicable  to  one  instance  of  low  eye  contact  are  not  applicable  
to  the  other  instance.  Additionally,  various  factors  might  influence  the  level  of  low  eye  
contact  given  in  each  instance.  For  example,  perhaps  one  person  feels  anxious  and  so  
exhibits  even  less  eye  contact  than  usual,  whilst  the  second  person  is  talking  to  a  trusted  
family  member  so  exhibits  more  eye  contact  than  usual.  Similarly,  there  are  specific  factors 
which  vary  between  particular  manifestations  of  low  social  skills.  Instances  of  low  social  
skills  will  also  vary  radically  in  the  variety  of  possible  words  said,  in  the  tone  they  are  
said  and  in  the  body  language  which  they  are  accompanied  by.  There  can  also  be  many  
influences  on  when,  how  and  to  what  degree  social  skills  are  exhibited,  such  as  who  is  
being  spoken  to,  in  what  setting  and  for  how  long.  Consider  also  the  variety  of  possible  
hallucinations,  the  variety  of  causal  factors  on  anxiety,  and  variety  of  possible  content  in  
repetitive  thought.  
In  contrast,  symptoms  lack  the  detail  which  is  specific  to  particular  manifestations  of
behaviour.  That  detail  has  been  abstracted  away.  Consequently,  symptoms  are  much  more  
generalisable.  It  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  one  symptom  of  low  social  skills  for  talking  
to  your  boss  and  a  different  symptom  of  low  social  skills  for  talking  to  your  parents.  
Rather,  such  details  are  abstracted  away.  This  means  symptoms  are  more  generalisable  and  
applicable  to  multiple  situations.  They  can  be  assigned  to  multiple  people  rather  than  just  
being  tied  to  the  specific  details  of  a  particular  person.  Two  people  can  be  considered  to  
exhibit  the  same  symptom  despite  exhibiting  different  behaviours.  
Having  outlined  the  distinction  between  behaviour  and  symptoms  I  now  develop  a  
conceptual  understanding  of  symptoms.  To  do  this  I  consider  the  distinction  between  data  
and  phenomena.  
4.0  Are  symptoms  ready  made  or  constructed?  
To  develop  a  conceptual  understanding  of  symptoms,  I  draw  upon  a  well-known  distinction 
made  by  Bogen  and  Woodward  in  their  seminal  1988  paper  Saving  the  Phenomena.  
Traditionally,  philosophy  of  science  demarcates  sharply  between  data  and  theory.  
1
I  will  use  the  word  symptom  in  a  manner  which  glosses  over  a  terminological  distinction  which  is  
sometimes  employed  in  medicine.  Sometimes,  a  distinction  is  made  between  signs,  which  are  observable  by
an  external  agent,  and  symptoms,  which  are  unobservable  feelings  of  the  illness.  However,  philosophers  of  
psychiatry  rarely  make  a  distinction  between  signs  and  symptoms.  I  also  think  there  is  little  philosophical  
significance  to  be  placed  on  the  distinction  because,  even  though  one  is  observable,  both  are  theory-laden.  
Also,  the  terminology  of  signs  and  symptoms  does  not  match  how  people  typically  talk  of  symptoms.  For  
example,  low  social  skills  is  typically  described  as  a  symptom  of  autism  even  though  it  is  strictly  
speaking  composed  of  both  signs  and  symptoms.  Consequently,  I  will  lump  signs  and  symptoms  together  
into  a  general  notion  of  symptoms.
Traditionally,  data  is  seen  as  the  product  of  experiments  and  theories  explain  that  data.  
Bogen  &  Woodward  argued  this  picture  missed  out  an  important  intermediate  step.  They  
suggest  the  traditional  picture  of  data  and  theories  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  phenomena,
an  additional  step  lying  between  them.  The  basis  for  this  was  the  immense  number  of  
causal  factors  present  when  scientists  perform  experiments.  They  describe  how  
the  outcome  of  any  given  application  of  a  thermometer  to  a  lead  sample  
depends  not  only  on  the  melting  point  of  lead,  but  also  on  its  purity,  on  the  
workings  of  the  thermometer,  on  the  way  it  was  applied  and  read,  on  
interactions  between  the  initial  temperature  of  the  thermometer  and  that  of  the  
sample,  and  a  variety  of  other  background  conditions  (Bogen  &  Woodward  
1988,  p.309).
The  same  experiment  can  result  in  the  thermometer  providing  different  figures.  The  exact  
temperature  a  thermometer  registers  depends  on  specific  factors  present  in  specific  
experimental  conditions.  Despite  this,  scientists  still  posit  lead  as  having  a  melting  point  of  
327.5°C.  Scientists  thus  believe  that  lead  has  the  characteristic  of  having  a  specific  melting 
point  even  though  actual  experiments  can  provide  different  figures.  Consequently,  Bogen  
and  Woodward  posited  a  notion  of  phenomena  which  is  a  more  abstracted,  more  
generalised  notion  than  is  given  by  individual  experiments.  Thus  whilst  different  
experiments  provide  results  of  328.0°C,  327.1°C,  327.3°C,  etc.,  scientists  might  agree  upon  
phenomena  as  327.5°C,  a  general  figure  abstracted  away  from  specific  experiments.  
The  motivation  for  formulating  phenomena  is  that  specific  experimental  setups  are  
influenced  by  multiple  causal  factors  but  scientists  may  only  be  interested  in  certain  causal  
factors.  Bogen  writes  that  “[d]ata  typically  result  from  complex,  loosely  connected,  short-
lived  assemblies  of  causal  factors...  The  causes  that  produce  data  sets  are  never  exactly  the 
same  from  one  trial  to  another”  (2010,  p.789).  Many  causes  are  not  relevant  to  the  
phenomena,  since,  as  Woodward  comments,  “in  typical  cases  data  are  the  result  of  many  
causal  factors  and  at  most  [only]  some  of  these  will  have  to  do  with  the  phenomena  of  
interest”  (Woodward  2010,  p.167).  Scientists  typically  want  a  general  figure  which  is  not  
tied  to  specific  causal  factors  present  in  specific  instances  of  the  experiment.  Depending  on 
the  topic  of  study,  a  scientist  may  not  be  interested  in  insignificant  factors  like  variations  
in  air  temperature  which  have  a  minimal  influence  on  results.  Such  causal  factors  are  not  
considered  the  cause  which  determined  the  melting  point  of  lead,  rather,  they  are  incidental 
factors  which  interfere  with  finding  the  correct  figure.  The  true  cause  is  considered  to  be  
the  molecular  structure  of  lead.  
I  employ  Bogen  and  Woodward's  framework  of  data  and  phenomena  to  conceptualise
the  distinction  I  made  between  behaviour  and  symptoms.  Behaviour  should  be  understood  as
data  and  symptoms  should  be  understood  as  phenomena.  Instances  of  behaviour  have,  like  
data,  details  which  are  specific  to  particular  instances.  These  are  due  to  a  multiplicity  of  
causes  being  present.  Symptoms,  like  phenomena,  abstract  away  those  details  and  so  are  
generalisable,  not  being  tied  to  specific  instances.  
I  now  consider  the  ontological  status  of  phenomena.  In  their  1988  paper  Bogen  and  
Woodward  hold  a  realist  understanding  of  phenomena  (1988,  p.337).  They  provide  few  
details  but  seem  to  suggest  phenomena  are  things  in  the  world  which  scientists  can  
discover.  This  realist  approach  faces  the  challenge  of  accommodating  the  abstract  nature  of  
phenomena.  Additionally,  Woodward  has  later  developed  his  account  of  phenomena  in  two  
ways  which  potentially  further  challenge  a  realist  understanding.  Firstly,  Woodward  argues  
that  “[d]ecisions  to  ignore  or  discard  data  play  a  central  role  in  virtually  all  data-to-
phenomena  reasoning”  (Woodward  2000,  p.177).  Consequently,  realist  understandings  need  
to  accommodate  choices  being  made  over  which  results  and  causal  influences  to  abstract  
away.  Secondly,  Woodward  argues  the  phenomena  which  are  formulated  are  relative  to  
purpose  (Woodward  2011,  p.174).  This  suggests  that  phenomena  are  not  simply  ‘things’  
which  are  out  there  in  the  world  independent  of  our  interests.  To  further  explore  the  
ontological  status  of  phenomena  I  draw  upon  Psillos  for  a  realist  understanding  of  
phenomena  and  Massimi  for  a  neo-Kantian  understanding  of  phenomena.  
Psillos  takes  a  realist  understanding  of  phenomena  yet  simultaneously  rejects  notions  
that  phenomena  are  things  which  are  out  there  in  the  world.  He  describes  how  “phenomena
(e.g.,  the  melting  point  of  a  substance  or  the  path  of  a  planet)  are  abstracted  from  the  data
by  means  of  a  number  of  sophisticated  techniques  based  on  a  rather  substantive  set  of  
assumptions  and  theories”  (2004,  p.397).  He  describes  how  those  assumptions  and  theories  
involve  significantly  unrealistic  elements,  giving  the  example  of  “imponderable  fluids,  
frictionless  planes,  ideal  gases,  perfectly  spherical  objects”  (Psillos  2011,  p.17).  These  are  
false  assumptions  since,  for  example,  planes  are  not  frictionless.  They  are  idealisations  
which  resemble  “nothing  in  the  physical  world”  (Psillos  2011,  p.8).  He  sees  them  as  
“abstract  entities…  not  concrete  objects”  (Psillos  2011,  p.8).  Psillos  sees  realism  as  based  
around  what  he  calls  the  explanatory  criterion  (2011,  p.15).  If  a  scientific  theory  (or  more  
specifically  an  aspect  of  a  scientific  theory)  contributes  to  the  best  explanatory  framework  
for  understanding  the  world  then  it  should  be  considered  real.  Whether  that  thing  is  a  
concrete  physical  thing  or  is  abstract  is  not  relevant  to  that  explanatory  criterion  (2011,  
p.15).  Consequently,  phenomena  can  be  understood  as  real  despite  them  not  being  physical  
things.
Massimi  has  developed  a  neo-Kantian  account  which  sees  phenomena  as  made  by  
scientists  rather  than  ready-made  by  the  world.  She  argues  which  phenomena  scientists  
postulate  depends  upon  how  data  is  abstracted  away.  She  gives  the  example  of  Galileo's  
experiments,  describing  how  
the  goal  of  the  inclined  plane  experiment  was  to  extract  from  the  appearance  
(motion  of  a  bronze  ball  along  an  inclined  plane)  the  property  of  uniform  
acceleration....  we  should  not  think  that  what  we  observe,  say,  a  free-falling  
object,  is  the  rough-and-ready  observable  phenomena...  If  we  stick  to  the  level  
of  observable[s]...  Galileo  may  seem  no  more  right  than  Aristotle  (Massimi  2008,
p.25).  
Galileo  made  observations  of  the  ball  and  recorded  various  results.  All  these  results  would  
have  been  influenced  by  many  different  factors  like  friction  and  the  varying  surface  of  the  
wood.  Consequently,  when  Galileo  formulated  the  phenomena  of  uniform  acceleration  he  
had  to  abstract  away  all  the  non-uniformity.  This  means  that,  as  Massimi  suggests,  
“phenomena  are  something  that...  we  make  rather  than  something  that  comes  to  us  as  
ready-made  in  nature”  (Massimi  2008,  p.8  emphasis  original).  The  actual  speed  at  which  
the  ball  travelled  in  any  given  experiment  was  in  some  sense  real  and  non-constructed.  
This,  however,  does  not  constitute  uniform  acceleration.  Acceleration  is  not  naturally  
uniform,  rather,  it  only  becomes  so  once  the  non-uniformity  is  abstracted  away  through  
constructing  uniform  acceleration.  As,  Massimi  argues,  “phenomena  we  infer  depends  on  the
way  we  have  carved  and  'massaged'  those  data”  (2011,  p.104).  Choices  need  be  made  about
what  to  abstract  away  when  formulating  phenomena.  For  example,  Galileo  could  have  
posited  acceleration  as  non-uniform  whilst  an  alternative  figure  for  the  melting  point  of  lead
could  be  posited  if  different  aspects  of  the  data  were  abstracted  away.  
Following  these  approaches  I  suggest  that  symptoms  are  not  ready-made  parts  of  the 
world.  Symptoms  can  be  understood,  following  Psillos’s  realist  notion  of  phenomena,  as  
real  models  which  have  no  counterpart  in  the  actual  world.  Alternatively,  they  can  be  
understood,  following  Massimi’s  Kantian  notion  of  phenomena,  as  being  made  by  us,  rather 
than  as  being  ready-made  in  the  world.  On  both  of  these  approaches,  symptoms  should  not 
be  seen  as  ‘things’  which  are  out  there  in  the  world.  As  such,  in  what  follows,  I  shall  
describe  symptoms  as  being  ‘constructed’.  The  word  constructed  is  sometimes  intended,  
including  by  critics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses,  to  have  negative  epistemic  connotations.  I  am  
not  endorsing  such  connotations,  rather,  in  sections  7.0  and  8.0  I  shall  consider  whether  
‘constructing’  symptoms  entails  negative  epistemic  connotations.
5.0  Alternative  ways  to  formulate  symptoms
I  will  now  show  how  symptoms  are  constructed  from  behaviour  through  considering  notions
of  low  social  skills  in  autism.  I  focus  upon  autistic  low  social  skills,  rather  than  social  
skills  more  generally,  to  draw  upon  rich  historical  and  modern  examples.  I  take  it  as  
uncontroversial  that  people  can  exhibit  a  large  variety  of  behaviour  in  social  situations  
involving  two-way  interpersonal  communication.  Additionally,  some  of  that  behaviour  can  
fall  outside  implicitly  conceived  norms  about  what  is  acceptable  conduct  in  social  situations 
(views  on  what  is  acceptable  conduct  can  vary  between  different  social  groups,  cultures  and
historical  eras).  All  these  behaviours  are  in  some  sense  real  and  actually  occur,  just  as  the  
ball  that  Galileo  rolled  down  the  inclined  plain  was  real  and  took  a  particular  path.2  In  this
sense,  people  exhibit  non-constructed  behaviour.  However,  these  behaviours  are  not  the  
same  as  symptoms  because,  as  described  earlier,  specific  details  are  missing  from  the  
abstract  symptom.  I  highlight  this  with  an  historical  example  of  alternative  
conceptualisations  that  illustrates  that  scientists  can  construct  the  symptom  ‘low  social  skills 
in  autism’  in  different  ways.  
Understandings  of  ‘low  social  skills’  in  autism  have  varied  from  the  1940s  to  the  
current  day.  During  the  1940s  to  the  1960s,  an  era  when  psychoanalysis  held  significant  
influence,  psychiatrists  placed  great  significance  on  the  subjective  emotional  life  of  
individuals.  They  believed  that  emotional  processes  could  significantly  influence  which  
symptoms  were  exhibited  and  how  they  were  exhibited  (Evans  2017,  chapter  5;  Hollin  
2014,  p.104;  Nadesan  2005,  chapter  5;  Silverman  2012,  chapter  3).  Many  child  psychiatrists 
believed  the  symptoms  of  autism,  including  low  social  skills,  were  caused  by  underlying  
emotional  processes.  Interest  in  cognition  as  an  alternative  understanding  of  the  mind  started
around  the  1960s  and  by  the  early  1980s  focus  on  cognitive  processes  had  largely  replaced 
interest  in  emotional  processes.  Consequently,  the  low  social  skills  of  autism  came  to  be  re-
conceptualised  as  resulting  from  cognitive  abnormalities  such  as  theory  of  mind  deficits  
rather  than  as  a  reaction  to  inner  emotional  processes  (Evans,  2017,  chapter  5;  Eyal  et  al,  
2010,  chapter  9;  Hollin,  2014:  5;  Verhoeff,  2013:  451).  I  will  show  that  varying  
understandings  of  low  social  skills  can  result  in  the  symptom  being  constructed  in  different 
ways.  We  can  take  it  as  incontestable  that  cognition  and  emotions  can  both  potentially  
influence  whether  someone  struggles  in  social  situations,  but  depending  on  the  relative  
importance  attached  to  these  factors,  the  symptom  of  autistic  low  social  skills  can  come  to  
be  formulated  in  four  alternative  ways.
Firstly,  autistic  low  social  skills  could  be  considered  fundamentally  cognitive  in  
nature.  They  would  be  considered  to  be  caused  by  one  or  more  of  the  main  cognitive  
2
It  might  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  the  ball  that  Galileo  rolled  down  the  inclined  plain  was  real  and  
took  a  particular  path  when  measured  by  creatures  with  our  sensory  capacities.  So  too  the  behaviour  is  
actually  real  when  measured  by  creatures  with  our  sensory  capacities  and  our  (potentially  culturally  
specific)  social  norms.
psychological  theories  of  autism  (theory  of  mind  deficits,  weak  central  coherence  or  
executive  dysfunctions  (see  Hill  &  Frith  2003)).  On  such  an  approach  it  makes  sense  to  
abstract  away  the  influence  of  emotions  when  formulating  the  symptom  because  emotional  
reactions  would  be  considered  incidental.  Emotions  would  be  one  of  many  factors  which  
influence  how  and  when  symptoms  are  exhibited.  Just  as  who  is  being  spoken  to  can  be  
an  influence  yet  is  not  actually  the  cause  of  low  social  skills,  so  too  emotions  would  be  
seen  as  an  influence  but  not  the  cause  of  low  social  skills.  Consequently,  they  could  be  
abstracted  away.  For  example,  on  this  approach  an  individual  who  struggled  in  a  social  
situation  because  they  were  anxious  or  experiencing  emotional  turmoil  would  not  then  be  
considered  to  have  the  symptom  autistic  low  social  skills.  Similarly,  the  way  an  autistic  
individual  exhibits  low  social  skills  might  be  influenced  by  emotional  factors  yet  they  are  
only  incidental  causes  and  thus  not  the  actual  cause  of  low  social  skills.  This  is  the  
general  approach  adopted  by  contemporary  psychiatry  when  formulating  the  symptom  of  
autistic  low  social  skills  (see  Baron-Cohen  2001;  Happe  &  Frith  2006;  Hill  2004).  An  
individual  who  was  believed  to  exhibit  low  social  skills  because  they  were  in  distress  rather
than  because  they  had  abnormal  cognition  would  not  be  considered  to  actually  have  autism  
by  most  psychiatrists  or  psychologists  (Hollin  2014,  p.13).  For  example,  a  leading  British  
researcher  on  autism  studied  Romanian  orphanage  children  who  had  undergone  severe  
sensory  and  emotional  deprivation.  Though  many  met  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  autism  he  
considered  them  to  have  'quasi-autism'  (Evans  2013,  p.23;  Evans  2017,  p.419;  Hobson  2002,
p.203).3
Secondly,  autistic  low  social  skills  might  be  considered  fundamentally  emotional  in  
nature.  This  would  work  in  a  similar  way  to  the  first  example  except  that  rather  than  
emotions  being  abstracted  away,  cognitive  factors  would  instead  be  abstracted  away.  Low  
social  skills  would  be  considered  emotional  in  nature  whereas  cognitive  factors  are  
incidental  influences  which  can  be  abstracted  away.  This  approach  has  some  similarities  to  
notions  of  low  social  skills  employed  in  relation  to  autism  during  the  1930s  to  1970s.  Due 
to  biological  or  environmental  factors  (or  both),  an  individual  who  inadequately  integrated  
their  psychology  with  their  external  environment  could  face  additional  stresses  from  the  
environment  or  receive  inadequate  levels  of  comfort.  This  led  to  the  individual  developing  
defence  mechanisms  to  protect  themselves,  and  those  defence  mechanisms  caused  the  
symptoms  (Bender  1953,  p.667).  During  this  period  some  child  psychiatrists  believed  autistic
children  could  have  both  low  social  skills  and  low  intellect  but  conceptualised  the  low  
social  skills  as  stemming  from  anxiety  whilst  low  intellect  was  considered  a  confounding  
factor  which  did  not  itself  cause  low  social  skills  (Bender  1959,  p.82-84;  Creak  1963,  p.88;
Eisenburg  1956,  p.21).4
Thirdly,  both  cognition  and  emotions  could  be  considered  central,  non-incidental  
causal  factors.  Low  social  skills  could  be  caused  by  either  emotions  or  cognition  or  both  
simultaneously.  On  such  an  approach  a  particular  behaviour  is  an  instance  of  low  social  
skills  so  long  as  at  least  one  of  these  causes  is  present.  Many  factors,  such  as  who  is  
being  spoken  to  and  for  what  reason,  would  be  considered  incidental  but  neither  emotions  
3
As  they  aged  many  would  lose  the  symptoms  of  autism  though  by  adulthood  a  significantly  larger  portion
still  met  the  diagnostic  criteria  compared  to  typical  prevalence  rates.
4
Low  intellect  is  not  the  same  as  cognition  but  it  is  sufficiently  similar  to  highlight  my  point.  Low  
intellect  could  influence  how  a  child  expressed  low  social  skills  and  so  was  considered  a  confounding  
factor  when  studying  low  social  skills.  It  was  not,  however,  considered  to  be  the  cause  of  low  social  
skills  with  autistic  children.  Also,  note  that  children  in  these  decades  who  exhibited  a  clinical  picture  
associated  with  modern  notions  of  autism  were  often  diagnosed  under  different  names  such  as  childhood  
schizophrenia.
nor  cognition  would  be.  Some  commentators  have  similarly  argued  that  there  are  both  
cognitive  and  emotional  aspects  to  low  social  skills  in  autism  and  that  both,  whether  
occurring  together  or  alone,  are  manifestation  of  autistic  low  social  skills  (Hobson  2002,  
p.134;  Hodge  2004,  p.53;  Maiese  2013,  p.181).  
Fourthly,  the  symptom  low  social  skills  could  be  split  up  into  two  different  
symptoms.  One  symptom,  cognitive  low  social  skills,  would  be  caused  by  cognition  whilst  
a  different  symptom,  emotional  low  social  skills,  would  be  caused  by  emotions.  All  other  
factors  would  be  considered  incidental  and  thus  abstracted  from  the  generalised  symptom.  
These  alternative  ways  of  formulating  low  social  skills  shows  that  symptoms  are  
constructed  by  considering  two  causal  factors  (I  have  purposefully  only  focused  on  two  
factors;  in  reality  many  other  causal  factors  can  influence  low  social  skills  and  this  further  
emphasises  that  symptoms  are  constructed).  This  had  a  significant  influence  over  how  
symptoms  are  understood.  For  example,  historian  of  autism  Bonnie  Evans  describes  the  
move  from  psychoanalytical  understanding  of  autism,  which  primarily  focused  upon  
emotional  states,  towards  cognitive  approaches  as  being  a  “radical  transformation”  (Evans  
2017,  p.240).  Psychiatry  had  become  much  more  impersonal.  Focus  shifted  away  from  the  
subjective  feelings  and  specific  interpersonal  relationships  of  particular  patients  towards  
supposedly  objective  cognitive  mechanisms.  This  meant  that  what  counted  as  low  social  
skills,  and  how  low  social  skills  was  investigated,  change  significantly  (this  was  also  
influenced  by  other  changes  which  occurred  during  this  time  period,  such  as  the  move  from
case  studies  based  upon  clinical  reports  towards  psychological  experiments  and  statistical  
analysis  (Evans  2017,  p.211)).  I  have  shown  that  choices  need  be  made  over  which  
instances  of  behaviour  and  which  causal  factors  to  abstract  away.  Low  social  skills  are  not  
ready-made  in  one  of  those  ways.  Rather,  symptoms  are  constructed  through  a  process  of  
abstracting  away  behaviour  and  causal  factors.  In  the  remainder  of  this  article,  I  shall  firstly
consider  constraints  on  how  symptoms  are  formulated  and  then  consider  the  epistemic  
consequences  of  seeing  symptoms  as  constructed.  
6.0  Constraints  on  symptom  formulation
I  now  show  how,  although  there  are  choices  to  be  made  when  symptoms  are  formulated,  
there  are  significant  constraints  on  these  choices.  These  are  important  because  construction  
is  often  associated  with  arbitrariness.  However,  as  I  show  in  the  subsequent  section,  these  
constraints  mean  that  symptoms  should  not  be  understood  in  such  epistemologically  negative
ways.  For  now,  I  will  outline  three  different  constraints.  
Firstly,  symptom  formulation  is  constrained  by  limiting  the  number  of  causal  factors  
which  are  considered  non-incidental.  It  is  not  practically  possible  to  account  for  every  
causal  factor  so  some  will  be  considered  as  incidental.  As  previously  described,  scientists  
typically  aim  to  isolate  and  control  causal  factors  because  only  some  are  considered  
relevant  to  the  phenomena  under  study.  Scientists  will  aim  to  prevent  some  causal  factors  
occurring  whilst  trying  to  make  other  causal  factors  occur.  Some  philosophers  believe  that  
which  factors  should  be  considered  relevant  is  dependent  upon  theory  (Massimi  2007,  
p.249;  Woodward  2010,  p.797;  Teller  2010,  p.824;  Psillos  2004,  p.397)  or  at  least  reliant  
upon  non-empirical  considerations  (Bogen  2010,  p.779;  Glymour  2000,  p.32;  Woodward  
2010,  p.797).  The  melting  point  of  lead  is  often  considered  to  be  posited  on  theoretical  
grounds  because  235°  is  the  figure  molecular  theory  predicts  once  incidental  factors  are  
abstracted  away.  This  involves  theoretical  assumptions,  such  as  the  nature  of  chemical  
bonding.  Similarly,  to  demarcate  a  behaviour  as  being  caused  by  social  understanding  rather
than  emotional  or  intellectual  understanding  involves  many  theoretical  assumptions  about  the 
functioning  of  the  mind,  about  human  communication  and  about  how  humans  relate  to  their
environment.  In  relation  to  autism,  low  social  skills  is  currently  considered  to  be  caused  by 
cognitive  differences  like  theory  of  mind  deficits.  Consequently,  it  seems  uncontroversial  
that  an  experiment  measuring  autistic  low  social  skills  should  exclude  an  individual  who  
was  drunk.  Alcohol  intoxication  may  result  in  behaviour  which  can  resemble  instances  of  
low  social  skills  but  that  drunken  behaviour  does  not  constitute  low  social  skills  because  
the  behaviour  was  caused  by  non-relevant  causes.  Similarly,  an  individual  who  had  a  
history  of  emotional  neglect  may  also  exhibit  behaviour  which  resembles  low  social  skills  
but  that  behaviour  would  be  considered  quite  different  to  autistic  low  social  skills  because  
it  was  caused  by  childhood  experiences  rather  than  a  lack  of  theory  of  mind  (see  Evans  
2013,  p.23;  Evans  2017,  p.419  for  analysis).5
Secondly,  symptom  formulation  is  also  constrained  by  the  need  for  generality.  
Phenomena  are  formulated  at  a  greater  level  of  generality  than  are  data.  They  are  not  tied  
to  specific  instances  of  data,  rather,  they  cover  multiple  instances  of  data  so  are  formulated 
in  an  abstract  and  generalised  manner  (Bogen  &  Woodward  1988,  p.324).  Formulating  a  
phenomena  at  too  specific  a  level  of  detail  means  that  there  is  often  less  tractability  
(Batterman  2002,  p.22),  reduces  generality  (Rohwer  &  Rice  2013,  p.336)  and  applicability  
to  future  situations  (Myrvold  &  Harper  2002,  p.137).  Symptoms  are  also  things  which  can  
occur  in  multiple  contexts  and  are  not  tied  to  one  particular  context.  Low  social  skills,  for  
example,  can  occur  in  multiple  contexts  (home,  school,  work),  be  exhibited  towards  multiple
classes  of  people  (lifelong  friends,  complete  strangers,  colleagues),  and  for  multiple  reasons  
(casual  conversation,  requesting  information,  arguing  points).  It  is  implausible  that  a  
different  notion  of  low  social  skills  could  be  formulated  for  each  of  these  (and  many  other 
factors).  Having  many  context-dependent  symptoms  would  create  immense  practical  
problems,  such  as  massively  increasing  the  number  of  symptoms  mental  health  professionals 
would  need  be  trained  about  and  consider  when  assessing  patients.  Additionally,  whilst  it  is 
possible  to  control  for  many  factors  during  experiments  there  will  be  some  factors  that  it  is
near  impossible  to  control  for  experimentally  such  as  many  aspects  of  an  individual's  
unique  personality  and  past  history.  Consequently,  it  will  be  impossible  to  fully  investigate  
a  symptom  independent  of  many  factors  which  can  influence  how  instances  of  behaviour  
can  manifest.  
Thirdly,  phenomena  need  be  constrained  by  accuracy.  The  phenomena  need  be  
representative  of  the  data.  Phenomena  can  track  the  data  to  a  varying  degree  of  accuracy.  
How  much  accuracy  is  considered  acceptable  depends  upon  the  goals  of  the  scientists  
(Batterman  2002,  p.37;  Teller  2010,  p.890;  Woodward  2011,  p.174).  Whilst  phenomena  will 
not  accurately  portray  all,  or  even  any,  of  the  data  it  need  be  constrained  by  the  data.  It  
need  not  be  fully  accurate  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  can  be  legitimate  to  disregard  
instances  of  data  which  fall  sufficiently  outside  expected  results  (Woodward  2000,  p.177).  
Additionally,  the  data  which  is  considered  relevant  will  then  be  heavily  idealised  when  the  
phenomena  is  formulated.  For  example,  variance  in  data  points  will  be  smoothed  out  when  
a  graph  curve  is  charted  when  a  data  model  is  produced.  Despite  this,  phenomena  still  
needs  to  be  constrained  by  the  data.  It  would  be  illegitimate  for  scientists  to  simply  pick  
and  choose  which  data  to  ignore.  Rather,  there  would  need  to  be  reason  to  believe  the  
apparatus  was  not  functioning  correctly,  or  that  the  environmental  variables  are  too  
dissimilar  to  other  relevant  experiments,  or  that  the  results  fall  outside  a  range  predicted  by 
a  well  established  theory.  Similarly,  scientists  cannot  idealise  the  data  in  any  manner  that  
they  choose.  A  scientist  cannot  simply  posit  a  curve  on  a  graph  in  any  place  they  feel  like
5
However,  some  critics  would  argue  that  demarcation  is  made  on  questionable  theoretical  grounds  and  that  
autistic  low  social  skills  could  arise  purely  from  childhood  experiences  (Hobson  2002,  p.203).
doing  so.  Rather,  they  are  constrained  by  various  sophisticated  mathematical,  statistical  and  
modelling  techniques  (Woodward  2000,  p.145).  None  of  these  determine  which  phenomena  
scientists  formulate  but  they  do  constrain  which  phenomena  scientists  can  legitimately  
formulate.  
The  three  factors  I  have  outlined  show  that  there  are  significant  constraints  on  
symptom  construction.  This  means  that  symptom  formulation  is  not  a  purely  arbitrary  
process.  These  constraints  do  not  determine  which  symptoms  are  formulated  because  choices
need  be  made  when  these  constraints  are  applied.  Nothing  in  the  world  determines  which  
causes  to  abstract  away  or  how  theories  should  be  formulated,  rather,  these  depend  upon  
the  weighing  of  theoretical  virtues  (Psillos  1999,  p.171;  Solomon,  2001  p.19-20;  Day  &  
Kincaird  1994,  p.275).  Similarly,  nothing  in  the  world  determines  what  degree  of  accuracy  
and  what  degree  of  generality  is  required  for  a  symptom  to  be  appropriately  constructed,  
rather,  choices  need  be  made.  Although  choices  need  be  made  when  formulating  symptoms  
the  choices  are  constrained  choices  and  thus  not  purely  arbitrary  ones.  
7.0  The  epistemic  status  of  symptoms  
Many  critics  who  are  sceptical  about  psychiatric  diagnoses  do  not  extend  their  scepticism  to
psychiatric  symptoms.  However,  given  my  demarcation  between  behaviour  and  symptoms,  I  
will  now  show  that  criticisms  against  psychiatric  diagnoses  which  stem  from  concerns  about
construction  are  also  applicable  to  symptoms.  It  is  worth  noting  that  I  am  not  myself  
endorsing  these  criticisms  of  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Rather,  I  suggest  that  those  who  do  
endorse  these  criticisms  in  relation  to  psychiatric  diagnoses  may  have  to  endorse  them  in  
relation  to  symptoms  also.  
Firstly,  psychiatric  diagnoses  typically  cover  heterogeneous  groupings  of  symptoms  
(Kozak  &  Cuthbert  2016,  p.287;  Sanislow  et  al  2010,  p.632).  The  symptoms  exhibited  by  
two  people  with  the  same  diagnosis  can  differ  significantly.  This  is  taken  to  show  that  
diagnoses  tell  us  little  about  actual  people  (Smith  &  Combs  2010,  p.210).  However  parallel 
worries  can  be  raised  about  symptoms.  Symptoms  typically  cover  heterogeneous  groupings  
of  behaviour.  Two  instances  of  behaviour  may  be  instances  of  the  same  symptom  yet  differ
from  one  another  quite  significantly.  For  example,  an  individual  could  be  considered  to  
exhibit  low  social  skills  by  not  taking  part  in  conversations,  by  abnormal  body  language,  
by  speaking  over  people,  by  monologuing,  by  being  rude,  by  not  respecting  typical  flow  of 
conversation,  by  being  confrontational,  etc.  Additionally,  consider  how  auditory  
hallucinations  can  take  the  form  of  people  who  the  individual  knows,  people  who  they  do  
not  know,  robotic  voices,  alien  beings,  etc.  
Secondly,  in  many  cases  numerous,  often  contestable,  judgements  have  to  be  made  
when  diagnostic  criteria  are  constructed.  For  two  different  reasons  there  is  usually  ambiguity
and  a  significant  level  of  choice  over  how  to  formulate  diagnoses.  The  first  reason  is  the  
question  of  how  to  conceptualise  a  psychiatric  diagnosis.  This  often  involves  emphasising  
some  aspects  of  the  psychiatric  diagnosis,  seeing  them  as  more  central  than  others.  I  
previously  gave  the  example  of  how  historically  the  psychiatric  diagnosis  of  autism  has  
been  conceived  in  different  ways  depending  upon  whether  emotional  or  cognitive  aspects  
were  emphasised.6  Similar  concerns  are  true  of  symptoms.  There  are  also  choices  in  how  
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I  thank  an  anonymous  reviewer  for  pushing  me  to  clarify  this  paragraph.  In  doing  so  they  provided  
helpful  additional  examples  of  different  ways  to  conceptualise  psychiatric  diagnoses,  such  as  how  gambling 
disorder  could  be  considered  an  impulsion,  an  obsession  or  an  addiction.  They  also  mentioned  that  
researchers  emphasise  the  importance  of  different  symptoms  when  conceptualising  long  term,  low  grade  
depression  depending  upon  whether  or  not  they  think  it  is  a  personality  disorder.
they  can  be  formulated.  Symptoms  can  be  formulated  to  cover  a  wider  range  of  behaviours 
or  a  narrower  range  of  behaviours  (Fellowes  2017,  285;  Ochs  et  al  2004,  p.155;  Woodward
2008,  p.173)  and  this  will  influence  which  symptom  a  behaviour  is  assigned  to.  For  
example,  imagine  an  autistic  person  spends  a  lot  of  time  computer  programming  in  their  
spare  time.  This  could  be  understood  as  an  instance  of  the  symptom  of  obsessive,  narrowly 
focused  interests.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  understood  as  routine  like  repetitive  behaviour.  
It  also  might  be  understood  as  an  attempt  to  keep  their  environment  relatively  static  and  
thus  avoid  unexpected  changes.  It  could  even  be  construed  as  a  normal  interest  which  is  
not  a  symptom.  Which  symptom  (if  any)  the  behaviour  is  assigned  to  depends  upon  the  
way  in  which  each  symptom  is  formulated.  Additionally,  psychiatrists  might  decide  they  
could  better  accommodate  the  behaviour  of  autistic  people  by  replacing  those  three  
symptoms  with  a  much  more  general  symptom,  or  they  could  split  each  symptom  into  
multiple,  more  specific  symptoms.  The  second  reason  why  there  is  ambiguity  and  choice  is 
that  psychiatric  diagnoses  cover  correlations  of  symptoms.  That  is,  clusters  of  symptoms  
which  are  likely  to  occur  together  in  people  with  the  diagnosis.  However,  symptoms  
typically  only  cluster  together  very  weakly.  Symptoms  do  not  cluster  in  a  manner  whereby  
there  are  clear  gaps  between  symptom  clusters.  There  is  significant  overlap  between  
clusters. Typically  many  symptoms  do  not  obviously  fall  into  one  cluster  rather  than  another
(Kendell  &  Jablensky  2003,  6;  Zachar  2014,  113).  This  manner  of  formulating  diagnoses  
does  not,  independent  of  further  choices,  determine  which  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  
formulated  (Kendler,  Zachar  and  Craver  2011,  1149;  Kincaid  2014,  p.151;  Jablensky  2008,  
p.90).  The  computer  programming  example  shows  that  behaviours  do  not  fall  into  neatly  
demarcated  clusters.  Rather,  clusters  of  behaviour  can  overlap.  Some  behaviours  will  cluster 
together  as  more  stereotypical  instances  of  obsessive,  narrowly  focused  interests  (such  as  
intense  knowledge  of  an  obscure  topic  and  ability  to  monologue  in  conversations)  and  other
behaviours  will  cluster  together  as  more  stereotypical  instances  of  routine  like  repetitive  
behaviour  (such  as  repetitive  physical  movements  and  keeping  to  schedules)  but  the  
computer  programming  example  shows  a  behaviour  which  falls  between  these  clusters.  This 
creates  uncertainty  over  which  symptom  the  behaviour  should  be  assigned  to.
Thirdly,  psychiatric  diagnoses  appear  to  typically  cover  causally  heterogeneous  
individuals.  The  causes  present  in  one  individual  with  a  diagnoses  can  vary  significantly  
from  those  present  in  another  individual  with  the  same  diagnosis  (Cuthbert  &  Insel  2013,  
p.3;  Kozak  &  Cuthbert  2016,  p.287;  Sanislow  et  al  2010,  p.632).  This  means  that  
psychiatric  diagnoses  typically  only  correlate  with  causes  in  a  very  weak  manner  and  that  
psychiatrists  cannot  (or  so  far  have  failed  to)  demarcate  psychiatric  diagnoses  based  upon  
causes.  The  same  is  true  of  many  symptoms.  The  causal  influence  on  a  particular  instance  
of  behaviour  can  be  quite  different  to  the  causal  influences  on  a  different  instance  yet  both 
instances  of  behaviour  can  constitute  instances  of  the  same  symptom.  Recent  evidence  
suggest  that  there  is  no  direct  relationship  between  causes  and  symptoms.  The  same  
symptom  can  arise  from  multiple  causes  whilst  the  same  cause  can  result  in  multiple  
symptoms  (Cloninger  2014,  p.205;  Kendler  2005,  p.1247).  For  example,  Murphy  outlines  
how  instances  of  delusion  appear  to  have  very  diverse  causal  underpinnings  (2014,  p.120).  
This  shows  that  multiple  causes  can  produce  the  same  symptom.  Hoffman  &  Zachar  
outlines  how  the  amygdala  is  causally  connected  to  phobias,  anxiety,  disgust  and  decision  
making  (2017,  p.70).  This  shows  how  the  same  cause  can  produce  multiple  symptoms.  
Relatedly,  there  are  concerns  that  attempts  to  causally  demarcate  psychiatric  diagnoses  will  
result  in  focusing  on  only  some  causes  at  the  expense  of  other  causes.  For  example,  
demarcating  a  diagnosis  on  biological  factors  typically  means  idealising  away  the  influence  
of  psychological  factors.  Additionally,  there  might  be  choices  over  which  causes  to  focus  
upon  (Kendler,  Zachar  &  Craver  2011,  p.1149;  Philips  2015,  p.170;  Poland  2014,  p.35).  
Similarly,  constructing  symptoms  from  behaviour  requires  idealising  away  many  causal  
factors.  Only  some  will  be  considered  relevant  to  the  symptom  and  this  will  involve  a  
level  of  choice.  As  I  outlined  earlier,  autistic  low  social  skills  is  typically  understood  to  
stem  from  cognitive  abnormalities  but  social  and  emotional  factors  can  also  play  a  major  
causal  role  in  when  and  how  autistic  people  understand  social  information.  It  would  be  
difficult  to  causally  demarcate  autistic  low  social  skills  upon  all  relevant  causal  factors.  
Fourthly,  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  typically  considered  to  be  disorders.  The  concept  
of  disorder  is  a  heavily  debated  area  by  philosophers  of  medicine.  There  are  multiple  
models  of  disorder  and  there  is  little  consensus  upon  which  is  correct  (for  example,  see  
Cooper  2007;  Wakefield  1992).  This  can  lead  to  disagreement  over  whether  a  particular  
diagnosis  is  a  legitimate  disorder  (for  example,  Potter  (2013)  in  relation  to  oppositional  
defiance  disorder,  see  Wakefield  (2012)  in  relation  to  depression).  Also,  there  can  be  
borderline  cases  where  it  is  unclear  if  someone  with  only  mild  symptoms  is  actually  
disordered  (see  Horwitz  in  relation  to  depression  (2014)  and  Timini,  Garder  &  McCabe  
(2011)  in  relation  to  autism).  These  problems  are  also  applicable  to  symptoms.  It  can  be  
unclear  whether  any  particular  symptom  should  be  considered  pathological  or  when  a  
particular  behaviour  should  be  considered  an  instance  of  a  pathological  symptom.  For  
example,  autistic  people  often  exhibit  repetitive,  stereotyped  behaviour  known  as  stimming.  
These  are  typically  considered  to  be  pathological  symptoms  but  at  least  in  some  instances,  
they  cause  no  harm  to  the  individual  or  anyone  else.  They  may  actually  be  a  helpful  
means  of  coping  with  anxiety  (Doan  &  Fenton  2013,  p.61).  Similarly,  there  is  debate  over  
whether  all,  or  only  some,  instances  of  hallucinations  should  be  considered  to  be  
pathological.  Some  people  do  not  seem  impaired  by  hallucinations  and  it  is  unclear  where  
the  cut  off  point  between  pathological  and  non-pathological  hallucinations  should  be  placed  
(Bentall  2014,  p.40).  There  is  also  debate  over  whether  some  types  of  hallucinatory  content,
such  as  religious  content,  should  be  considered  pathological  or  non-pathological  (Rashed  
2010,  p.189).  
8.0  Reappraising  diagnoses
I  have  shown  that  some  critics  who  see  most  or  all  psychiatric  diagnoses  as  problematic  
constructs  have  similar  concerns  over  few  or  no  symptoms.  However,  I  have  so  far  made  
the  following  claims:  1)  symptoms  are  constructed,  2)  there  are  non-arbitrary  constraints  on 
symptom  formulation,  3)  arguments  which  critics  use  against  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  also  
applicable  to  symptoms,  including  against  symptoms  which  should  be  considered  non-
arbitrary.  If  all  these  three  points  are  accepted  then  I  suggest  that  there  are  three  possible  
options  available  to  the  critics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses.  
Firstly,  since  both  symptoms  and  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constructed,  and  since  
construction  is  considered  a  reason  for  concern  over  diagnoses,  critics  of  diagnoses  might  
extend  their  concern  to  symptoms.  They  could  claim  that  currently  employed  symptoms  are 
constructions  and  in  need  of  replacement  with  superior,  non-constructed  symptoms.  
Alternatively,  they  may  believe  that  currently  employed  symptoms  should  not  simply  be  
replaced  with  better  formulated  symptoms,  rather,  they  should  be  replaced  with  an  
alternative  way  of  understanding  people  which  does  not  involve  symptoms.  On  this  reading, 
the  four  concerns  that  are  held  over  psychiatric  diagnoses  described  in  the  previous  section, 
which  I  argued  were  also  applicable  to  symptoms,  would  be  considered  fatal  to  both  
psychiatric  diagnoses  and  symptoms.  This  would  be  true  regardless  of  any  non-arbitrary  
constraints  on  symptom  formulation.  
Secondly,  a  critic  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  might  remain  relatively  unconcerned  about 
symptoms  even  though  symptoms  are  constructed.  This  would  mean  the  critic  would  have  
reason  to  not  automatically  link  construction  with  epistemic  concerns.  Consequently,  that  
something  is  constructed  is  not  then  reason  to  have  epistemic  doubts  over  it.  This  then  
undermines  a  major  motive  for  epistemic  doubts  over  diagnoses  and  consequently  could  
undermine  calls  to  replace  diagnoses.  Critics  of  diagnoses  who  considered  symptoms  to  be  
scientifically  legitimate  would  have  reason  to  no  longer  reject  psychiatric  diagnoses.  On  this
reading,  the  four  concerns  which  critics  have  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  would  no  longer  be  
considered  epistemologically  problematic,  either  for  psychiatric  diagnoses  or  for  symptoms.  
Thirdly,  a  critic  could  attempt  to  supply  an  argument  which  showed  that  symptoms  
are  constructed  in  an  unproblematic  way  whereas  diagnoses  are  constructed  in  a  problematic
way.  Therefore,  there  would  be  reason  to  reject  diagnoses  without  rejecting  symptoms.  The  
viability  of  this  approach  will  depend  upon  further  argumentation  from  these  critics.  Some  
psychiatric  diagnoses  may  be  constructed  in  a  problematic  manner  and  some  may  be  
constructed  in  an  unproblematic  manner.  A  critic  who  accepted  that  construction  is  not  
automatically  reason  to  reject  psychiatric  diagnoses  would  need  give  specific  reasons  to  
reject  particular  psychiatric  diagnoses.  On  this  reading,  those  four  concerns  over  psychiatric  
diagnoses  which  critics  have  would  still  be  considered  problematic  for  psychiatric  diagnoses 
but  not  for  symptoms.  One  possible  approach  would  be  to  argue  that  the  three  constraints  
on  symptom  formulation  leave  symptoms  non-arbitrary  but  that  there  are  no  similar  
constraints  on  psychiatric  diagnoses.
The  primary  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  argue  that  diagnoses  and  symptoms  are  both  
constructed.  Those  who  hold  that  diagnoses  are  constructed,  should  accept  that  symptoms  
are  constructed  too.  This  paper  poses  a  challenge  to  those  critics  of  psychiatry  who  think  
that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constructed,  and  so  problematic,  but  who  take  symptoms  for  
granted.  I  have  shown  that  such  a  stance  is  untenable.  I  have  sketched  three  options  for  
critics  of  psychiatric  diagnosis.  To  end,  I  will  briefly  set  out  some  of  my  reasons  for  
preferring  the  second  option  –  i.e.  accept  that  both  diagnoses  and  symptoms  can  be  
constructed  and  also  legitimate  –  by  drawing  upon  Psillos’  realist  notion  and  Massimi’s  
neo-Kantian  notion.  Psillos  bases  realism  on  whether  a  theory  contributes  to  the  best  
explanatory  framework  for  understanding  the  world  (2011,  p.15).  Massimi  describes  how  
entities  are  “functionally  relevant  clusters  of  properties”  (2014,  p.428)  which  should  be  
projectable  (inductive)  and  should  be  embedded  within  a  wider  network  of  claims  (2011,  
p.110;  2014,  p.428).  Psychiatric  diagnoses  can  potentially  play  these  roles.  
A  psychiatric  diagnosis  is  an  abstract  entity  which  groups  together  people  who  
exhibit  at  least  a  certain  number  of  symptoms  of  a  diagnostic  criteria.  Rather  than  simply  
considering  a  particular  individual  with  particular  characteristics,  the  abstract  psychiatric  
diagnoses  abstracts  away  many  significant  aspects  of  particular  individuals  but  then  draws  
commonalities  between  many  particular  individuals.  This  means  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  
can  enhance  our  understanding  of  people  at  a  particular  level  of  abstraction.  
This  helps  understanding  the  world  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  it  assists  inductive  claims.  
Knowing  that  an  individual  accurately  fits  the  diagnostic  criteria  of  autism  allows  many  
probabilistic  inductive  claims  of  how  particular  individuals  act  in  particular  situations.  
Whilst  most  psychiatric  diagnoses  cover  individuals  with  heterogeneous  symptoms  this  still  
allows  a  significant  level  of  non-trivial  inductions.  Despite  the  level  of  heterogeneity  of  
associated  symptoms,  knowing  someone  is  autistic,  schizophrenic  or  fails  to  meet  the  
diagnostic  criteria  of  any  psychiatric  diagnoses  provides  significant  information  about  
possible  behaviour.  This  provides  inductive  knowledge  at  a  level  of  abstraction  which  is  not
present  when  considering  particular  individuals.  
Symptoms  can  also  assist  inductive  claims.  Knowing  someone  has  the  symptom  low  
social  skills  entails  probabilistic  inductive  claims  about  possible  manifestations  of  behaviour  
in  a  variety  of  settings.  This  is  true  even  though  a  symptom  can  cover  a  wide  range  of  
behaviour.  
Secondly,  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be  embedded  within  a  wider  framework  of  
knowledge.  They  can  be  embedded  within  a  network  of  probabilistic  causal  factors  and  
within  theoretical  accounts  of  how  the  mind  works  and  how  humans  relate  to  one  another.  
This  systematically  creates  links  between  different  parts  of  the  world  which  can  also  be  
used  for  explanatory  claims  at  a  particular  level  of  abstraction.  Rather  than  considering  how
a  particular  individual  relates  to  these  factors,  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  shows  how  a  
generalised,  abstract  class  relates  to  these  factors.  This  is  helpful  because  causes  (be  them  
genetic,  neurological,  psychological  or  environmental)  in  psychiatry  are  almost  always  linked
to  symptoms  and  diagnoses  in  a  probabilistic  manner.  Causation  often  requires  combinations 
of  many  different  factors  working  together,  and  changes  in  the  combinations  of  factors  
sometimes  will  result  in  a  different  outcome  (or  no  outcome)  and  sometimes  will  not  
(Cuthbert  &  Insel  2009,  p.989;  Haslam  2002,  p.209;  Lilienfeld  2014,  p.136).  Also,  causes  
sometimes  take  the  form  of  a  developmental  pathway  where  a  series  of  processes  will  
unfold  which  can  depend  upon  the  specific  process  present  in  the  earlier  chain  of  events  
and  which  can  vary  from  case  to  case  (Casey,  Oliveri  &  Insel  2014,  p.351).  That  differing 
combinations  of  causal  factors  have  different  probabilities  of  outcomes  is  not  highlighted  by
just  considering  one  specific  individual  with  one  specific  set  of  causes.  In  contrast,  the  way
in  which  probabilities  combine  together  based  upon  the  presence  of  various  causal  factors  is
highlighted  by  considering  multiple  individuals,  with  various  combinations  of  causes,  to  
constitute  instances  of  an  abstract  psychiatric  diagnoses  (see  Schaffner's  diagram  on  the  
probabilities  of  developing  depression  for  an  example  (2007,  p.54)).  
Symptoms  can  also  be  embedded  within  a  wider  framework.  They  are  embedded  
into  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  can  also  be  embedded  within  a  network  of  probabilistic  
causal  factors.  Additionally,  symptoms  can  be  used  to  embed  behaviour.  Rather  than  simply 
considering  each  instance  of  behaviour  as  being  unique,  particular  instances  of  behaviour  
can  be  embedded  within  symptoms.  A  particular  behaviour  is  not  simply  a  unique  instance  
of  social  interaction,  rather,  it  can  fall  into  the  general  symptom  low  social  skills.  This  
means  unique  instances  of  behaviour  can  be  embedded  within  abstract  symptoms  which  can 
then  be  embedded  within  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  probabilistic  causal  factors.7  
This  shows  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  worth  employing  because  they  can  provide 
useful  information  at  a  certain  level  of  abstraction.  However,  this  is  not  to  claim  that  other 
ways  of  abstraction  are  unimportant.  There  are  three  types  of  alternative  ways  of  
abstraction.  Firstly,  someone  can  be  considered  an  instance  of  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  and  
be  considered  a  unique  individual.  The  psychiatric  diagnosis  relates  the  individual  to  a  
general  class  whereas  it  will  also  be  useful  to  focus  on  the  individual  to  describe  many  
aspects  not  described  by  their  psychiatric  diagnosis.  Secondly,  I  have  focused  upon  
categorical,  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses.  There  are  also  dimensional  and  psychodynamic  
diagnoses  and  these  would  provide  information  at  other  levels  of  abstraction.  It  will  often  
be  useful  to  employ  multiple  types  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  simultaneously  to  provide  
information  in  various  abstract  ways.  Thirdly,  alternative  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  
diagnoses  which  involve  different  abstract  groupings  might  be  superior  to  currently  
7
It  could  be  responded  that  I  have  not  met  Psillos’  criteria  of  an  explanatory  framework.  However,  
probabilistic  causation  is  still  explanatory.  It  explains  how  a  large  number  of  factors  can  combine  together  
to  produce  various  effects  in  particular  individuals.  Additionally,  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  can  explain  
symptoms  much  like  how  Psillos  describes  how  a  more  abstract  model,  such  as  a  Linear  Harmonic  
Oscillator,  can  explain  a  less  abstract  model,  such  as  a  specific  spring.  Psillos  argues  the  relationship  can  
be  explanatory  despite  not  being  causal  (2010,  p.957).  In  this  manner  an  abstract  diagnosis  can  explain  the
symptoms  of  a  particular  individual  despite  not  causing  them.
employed  ones.  This  is  certainly  a  possibility  but  they  would  still  be  constructed  and  cover 
heterogeneous  symptoms  and  causes.  The  possibility  of  superior  categorical,  polythetic  
psychiatric  diagnoses  does  not  mean  current  ones  should  be  dismissed.  
9.0  Conclusion
In  this  paper  I  have  developed  a  new  conceptual  understanding  of  symptoms.  I  have  drawn 
upon  the  distinction  between  data  and  phenomena  to  demarcate  between  behaviour  and  
symptoms.  Behaviour  is  what  people  exhibit.  Symptoms  are  how  psychiatrists  model  that  
behaviour.  This  means  that  symptoms  are  constructed  rather  than  being  pre-built  parts  of  
the  world.  I  have  outlined  three  different  non-arbitary  constraints  on  constructing  symptoms, 
namely  causal  relevancy,  frequency  and  generality.  
Critics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  typically  not  concerned  about  psychiatric  
symptoms.  Much  of  the  concern  over  psychiatric  diagnoses  stem  from  them  being  
constructed.  However,  I  have  shown  that  symptoms  are  also  constructed.  Additionally,  I  
have  shown  that  common  criticisms  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  also  applicable  to  
symptoms.  To  finish  I  sketched  my  preferred  response  to  the  dilemma  I  have  posed;  I  
suggest  that  both  symptoms  and  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be  of  scientific  and  
epistemological  value  despite  being  constructed.
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